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Cultural Determinants of Workplace Arbitration 
in the United States and Italy 
Maurizio Del Conte* 
Ann C. Hodgest 
Although Italy and the United States are both advanced industrial economies, the law and 
practice of workplace arbitration differs significantly in the two countries. This Article explores 
those variations and analyzes the reasons lbr the divergent evolution of arbitration. The Article 
concludes that histon'cal and cultural differences in legal systems and labor and employment 
relations are explanatory forces. While the United States could provide a more balanced system of 
arbitration by learning from the Italian systems greater protection of workers, given the current 
reality neither system seems likely to undergo significant change in the near fiiture. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization of employment is making knowledge of labor and 
employment law of all nations an imperative. At the same time, 
comparative legal studies can help nations learn from one another and 
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improve on existing legal systems. As the United States Supreme Court 
is hurtling U.S. employment law into private dispute resolution and the 
Italian labor law system is under substantial pressure for reform as a 
result of economic stresses, a comparative study of workplace arbitration 
in the two countries is timely. 
This Article looks at the law and impact of workplace arbitration in 
the United States and Italy with a goal of analyzing the influences that 
led to the current systems and determining whether the countries can 
derive any useful lessons from one another. First, the Article looks 
briefly at the labor and employment law systems in the two countries. 
This analysis lays the backdrop for a discussion of the evolution and use 
of arbitration in the two countries. The Article then moves to an analysis 
of the similarities and differences between arbitration in Italy and the 
United States and the reasons for those differences. Finally, the Article 
focuses on lessons that can be drawn from the two systems. 
The employment arbitration system in the United States is currently 
weighted in favor of employers and could learn from the Italian 
protection of workers. The Article suggests several modifications that 
would provide better balance in the current system. But the Article 
concludes that the historical and cultural forces that have shaped 
arbitration in the two countries make it unlikely that either will change 
significantly in the near future. 
II. LAW AND CONTRACT IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY 
The legal systems governing the workplace in the United States and 
Italy vary dramatically. These differences contribute to the differential 
approach to arbitration in the two countries. This Part will briefly 
explore the legal systems in order to assist in understanding the source of 
the differences in the use of arbitration. 
In the United States, statutes set minimum terms and conditions of 
employment that can be expanded by labor unions negotiating with 
employers; by individual employees negotiating with employers, 
typically highly skilled, highly paid employees; or by employers acting 
unilaterally. Statutes set a relatively low minimum wage; require 
overtime pay at a higher rate for more than forty hours work per week; 
prohibit child labor; prescribe standards for a safe and healthful 
workplace; require unpaid leave for illness, childbirth, adoption, and care 
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for an ill family member; and set certain standards for pensions and 
health insurance voluntarily provided by employers.1 
The law provides benefits through mandatory insurance for workers 
who are unemployed or injured on the job and requires contributions 
from the employer and employee into a national retirement system. In 
addition, the law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, 
national origin, gender, age, citizenship, genetic makeup, and disability. 
The law also determines who is an employee and who is an independent 
contractor not protected by employment laws. Most employees are at 
will, meaning that they can be fired at any time for any reason. 
Employees can negotiate contracts of employment that limit the 
employer's authority to terminate them, but few have the power to do so 
unless represented by a union. 
For most employees in the United States, the employment laws and 
terms set by their employer govern their work because only 7.5% of 
employees in the private (nongovernmental) sector and 38.7% of 
employees in the public (governmental) sector have union representa-
tion.2 The laws are normally enforced by filing a lawsuit in court, using 
an attorney hired by the employee or by filing a claim with a government 
agency with a duty to enforce the laws. Part II will explain how and 
when arbitration can substitute for judicial enforcement. 
Union-represented employees are governed by a negotiated 
collective bargaining agreement, an enforceable contract including terms 
and conditions of employment in addition to the minimums required by 
law.3 This contract applies only to the employees represented by the 
union, however, so most employees are unaffected by these agreements. 
A contract will typically provide wage rates far in excess of the minimum 
wage; overtime premium pay in addition to what is required by law; and 
pay for holidays, vacations, funeral leave, and sick leave. It may provide 
1. As of 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires employers with 
fifty or more employees to provide health insurance for employees who work at least thirty hours 
per week. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A), (c)(4)(A) (2012). The effective dates of the 
insurance mandate have been postponed by regulation to 2015 and 2016, depending on employer 
size. Press Release, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared 
Responsibility Under the AffiJrdable Care Act for 2015, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases!Pages/jl2290.aspx. 
2. Union Affiliation of Employed J.tage and Salary Workem by Occupation and 
Industry, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2. 
t03.htm. For some explanations of the decline in union representation and, accordingly, power, 
see JULruS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT 16--22 (20 IO); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of/ndustrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual 
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 
579-84 (1992). 
3. LAURAJ. COOPER ET AL.,ADRINTHEWORKPLACE 3 (3d ed. 2014). 
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for certain benefits to be allocated by seniority, i.e., the length of time 
employed by the employer. Such benefits might include layoff and recall 
in times of reduced workload, promotions, and work assignments. A 
union contract will almost always require just cause for discipline and 
discharge, protection not normally available by law except for some 
government employees. In some industries, such as construction, 
mining, and longshoring, there is a history of multiple employers 
negotiating one contract with a union.4 In many cases, however, one 
employer negotiates with one union and sometimes only one facility of 
the employer negotiates with one union. Some contracts are negotiated 
on a national or statewide basis with local supplements, but many are 
exclusively local agreements. 
As discussed further below, these contracts are typically enforced 
using arbitration. In the United States, the law relating to unions and 
collective bargaining and the protection of efforts to deal with the 
employer collectively is known as labor law. The law relating to all 
employees, union and nonunion, is known as employment law. 
The Italian system operates quite differently, being more regulated 
and affording more protections to the workers. Traditionally, the law 
governs certain areas of employment and others have been covered by 
collective agreements, generally negotiated on a much broader basis and 
covering many more workers than in the United States. Among the 
subjects traditionally regulated by law in Italy are many similar to the 
United States, such as discrimination on grounds like marriage or 
pregnancy, nature of the work relationship (employment or self-
employment), social security, health and safety in the workplace, and 
protection for union activity. In contrast to American law, however, 
Italian law provides protection against unjust dismissals. Contracts in 
Italy cover subjects such as job duties, career development, special types 
of pay under the contract, violations of the disciplinary code, the notice 
period for termination of employment, and noncompetition covenants. 
The two countries differ significantly in the form of unionization 
and the coverage of collective bargaining agreements. In Italy, the 
organization of workers has occurred, with some rare exceptions such as 
managers and air traffic controllers, based on the type of employer for 
which they work. As a result, trade unions operate in particular 
industries or sectors. The collective contracts are typically nationwide 
sector agreements containing the minimum economic and normative 
4. Comment, The Status of Mu!tiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 1967 DUKEL.J. 558, 558-59 & n.3. 
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terms of employment for all the workers in a certain productive sector 
(the category), regardless of union membership. For some areas or 
institutions of general interest, however, agreements may cover all 
categories of workers (interconfederate agreements). This happened, for 
example, for individual and collective dismissal; before the legislature 
intervened to regulate the subject, the only regulation was contained in 
interconfederate agreements. In some cases, collective bargaining 
follows individual local and territorial contexts, with specific norms for 
certain areas of the country (territorial agreements). It is the nationwide 
sector collective contract that now represents the main instrument of 
collective negotiation in the regulation of employment relationships and 
that governs the various types of collective contracts and agreements in 
ltaly.5 
The relationships between contractual sources and legal sources in 
labor law are constructed hierarchically as in all of civil law, with the 
legal source having automatic prevalence over the contractual source. 
This model is founded on a fundamental postulate: that the 
heteronomous source (the law) has the imperative task of safeguarding 
the fundamental rights-of freedom, dignity, and safety-of the 
subordinate workers.6 Consequently, every norm produced from a 
contract-be it individual or collective-that lowers the system defined 
by the heteronomous precept will be annulled and replaced by the 
corresponding legal precept (in application of article 1418 of the civil 
code). 7 The law is unbreakable; it cannot be modified or waived by the 
contract.8 
Until the 1970s, there were few situations where law and contract 
overlapped. Accordingly, there was a mutual relationship of noninter-
ference, and as a last resort in case of conflict, the law prevailed over the 
contract, a criterion of unbreakability in peius. 
At present, however, the overlap of autonomous (contractual) and 
heteronomous (legal) sources is the norm in the regulation of labor law, 
creating a situation of continual conflict, competition and, often, 
integration between the various sources. In practice then, the relationship 
5. There are, however, some recent signs of change caused by the trend, common in all 
industrialized countries, of decentralized negotiation. See Legge 14 Settembre 2011, n. 148 in 
G.U. 16 settembre 2011, n. 216 art. 8. For an international overview of the phenomenon, see 
ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., DECENTRALIZING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF LABOUR 
UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES (2007). 
6. See RAFFAELE DE LUCA TAMAJO, LA NORMA INDEROGABILE NEL DIRITTO DEL LAVORO 
(1976). 
7. Art. 1418 Codice civile [C.c.J(lt.). 
8. Id 
42 TULANE J. OF JNT'L & COMP LAW [Vol. 23 
between autonomous and heteronomous sources is better explained in 
terms of competing sources--even though they are hierarchically 
ordered, they do not simply follow an abstract hierarchical criterion. 
Today, contractual sources are sometimes involved in actual normative 
procedures, as the presupposition for the law and as the content of the 
law. In many cases, contractual sources deviate from legal sources (for 
example in the case of a change of worker's duties); in others, laws are 
integrated (as in the case of the proposal of staff leasing legitimated 
during collective bargaining); in yet others, contractual agreements are 
proposed as alternative sources to the law for the regulation of 
employment relationships (illustrated by the case of the criteria of choice 
of workers to be dismissed collectively).9 
In all these cases, the legislature realizes that collective bargaining 
constitutes the most suitable instrument of social regulation and so does 
not exercise its regulatory power. Theoretical debate on the topic has for 
some time highlighted a progressive enrichment and diversification of 
the functions of bargaining. In an evolving economic and social context, 
bargaining has come to involve issues in which it does not perform its 
traditional acquisitive function regarding wage increases and new 
guarantees, but rather "administers" risks to which a group of workers 
are exposed. With increasing frequency in the last few decades, often 
thanks to specific legal delegation, collective bargaining has been 
entrusted with the additional task of collaborating in the organization of 
labor and in particular handling company crises and the ensuing 
employment problems. 
Having briefly reviewed the system of employment relations and the 
legal background in each of the two countries, the stage is now set to 
place arbitration in context as a part of the system in each country. 
Ill. ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY 
A. Arbitration in the United States 
1. Labor Arbitration 
While labor unions in the United States initially resisted arbitration, 
a number of forces combined to encourage its acceptance and today it is 
the most common method of resolving disputes over the meaning and 
9. According to Law No. 233/1991, in case of redundancy, the workers to be dismissed 
must be selected on the basis of the criteria designed by an ad hoc collective agreement. If the 
collective parties fail to reach an agreement, the criteria are automatically provided by the law as 
follows: number of dependents of each worker, seniority, and organizational reasons. Legge 23 
luglio 1991, n.223 in G.U. 27 luglio 1991, n.43. 
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application of labor contracts.10 Both governmental encouragement and 
negotiation of arbitration agreements by unions and employers in major 
manufacturing industries fueled the growth of labor arbitration prior to 
World War II. 11 As aptly stated in 1940 by Walter Reuther, a leader of the 
United Autoworkers Union: 
You cannot strike General Motors plants on individual grievances. One 
plant going down will affect the 60 other plants. You have to work out 
something to handle individual grievances . . . . I don't want to tie up 
90,000 workers because one worker was laid off for two months. That is a 
c th . 12 case 1or e umprre. 
During the war, the War Labor Board, created by the government to deal 
with labor disputes that might interfere with production of goods needed 
for the war, "encouraged and then required parties to include grievance 
arbitration provisions" in collective bargaining agreements, and to accept 
arbitration awards as binding.13 Today, arbitration is included in virtually 
all collective bargaining agreements. 
In 194 7, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act to encourage unions 
and employers in the private sector to use alternative dispute resolution 
methods to resolve disagreements over both contract negotiation and 
contract interpretation. 14 Additionally, Congress made labor agreements 
enforceable in the federal courts. 15 These changes further cemented 
arbitration as the method of choice for contract interpretation issues. As 
for disputes over contract negotiation, mediation is, and has been, the 
choice for resolving private sector disputes. 
While refusing to enforce arbitration agreements in other contexts, 
in the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided that 
agreements to arbitrate disputes under collective bargaining agreements 
were enforceable as a matter of national labor policy.16 In a series of 
cases collectively known as the Steelworkers Tniogy, the Court adopted 
standards that were very deferential to arbitration, enforcing both 
agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards. 17 Because arbitration 
I 0. See generally Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The 
Early ~aJ:Y, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373 (1983). 
II. ldat417-20. 
12. Id at419. 
13. COOPER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-12. 
14. Id at 13; 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 201-203 (2012). 
15. 29 u.s.c. § 185. 
16. SeeTextile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1957). 
17. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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provisions in labor agreements were the quid pro quo for agreements not 
to strike, the Court concluded that the judicial hostility toward arbitration 
agreements in other contexts was not appropriate. 18 "[A ]rbitration of 
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel 
of the collective bargaining process itself."19 Arbitration is the method of 
peacefully filling contractual gaps and resolving the disputes about the 
meaning of the contract, avoiding interruptions of production.20 
The Steelworkers Trilogy established that the courts should decide 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute but that absent 
the clearest evidence of exclusion from arbitration, the courts should 
order arbitration.21 The Supreme Court cautioned the lower courts to 
avoid entanglement in the merits of the claim in deciding whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate.22 In the third Steelworkers Trilogy case, the 
Court adopted the same deference upon judicial review of arbitration 
awards. The courts should not review the merits of the arbitrator's 
decision, but should enforce the decision so long as the award "draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement."23 Over time, another 
narrow exception to enforcement evolved, denying enforcement to 
arbitration awards that violate public policy.24 Based on the Steelworkers 
Tnlogy and its progeny, few arbitration decisions under labor agreements 
are appealed and fewer still overturned by the courts.25 Since 
unionization in the private sector has decreased, however, there are fewer 
labor arbitrations.26 
The parties to collective bargaining agreements determine the 
arbitration procedure and it varies widely, although some generalizations 
are possible. The procedure is not commonly specified in the 
agreement.21 Many arbitration hearings follow a relatively formal, 
judicial-like format using opening and closing arguments, direct and 
cross-examination of witnesses, and in many cases, written posthearing 
18. Wamor& Gulf,363 U.S. at 578. 
19. Id 
20. Id at 581. 
21. Id at 582-83. 
22. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. 
23. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
24. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) 
(recognizing the public policy exception to enforcement of arbitration awards, but refusing to 
overturn an arbitration award that reinstated a truck driver who tested positive for illegal drugs on 
public policy grounds). 
25. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Tums: New 
Evidence on the Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. PoL'Y REV. 191, 204 (2007). 
26. Id. at 194, 204. 
27. The description of the labor arbitration procedure that follows is drawn from COOPER 
ETAL., supra note 3, at 19-29. 
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briefs to the arbitrator. The rules of evidence that apply in court do not 
formally apply in arbitration. Some parties choose more informal 
procedures and may omit briefs, formal statements, and formal 
examination of witnesses. Some unions and employers use attorneys in 
arbitration, while others prefer to employ trained lay representatives. 
Arbitrators are selected by the method negotiated by the parties. 
Most agreements provide for one neutral arbitrator, but some use a 
system of three, or occasionally five, arbitrators, one or two chosen by 
each party and a neutral. Most agreements provide that an arbitrator is 
chosen separately for each dispute, known as "ad hoc." Ad hoc 
arbitrators are chosen by mutual agreement or using the services of an 
impartial arbitration agency such as the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service, a federal agency; the American Arbitration 
Association, a private organization; or a state or local government 
agency. When the parties receive a list of possible arbitrators from an 
agency, the most common method of choosing from the list involves 
alternately striking names until only one remains. Some parties select 
one or a small group of arbitrators to serve as "permanent" arbitrator( s) 
for all the disputes arising during the course of the contract. The use of 
permanent arbitrators reduces delay and eliminates the need to educate 
the arbitrator about the industry in each hearing. 
The arbitrators that conduct labor arbitrations are not licensed or 
regulated by the state. Many arbitrators are lawyers, while others are 
academics or retired professionals, often from the field of labor relations 
or human resources. Most arbitrate part-time, while some individuals 
earn a living as arbitrators. Arbitrators are paid by the parties, with the 
union and employer commonly dividing the cost of arbitration. 
Arbitrators typically issue written decisions supported by reasoning, 
days, weeks, or sometimes months after the hearing.28 In some cases, 
however, the parties request an immediate oral decision from the 
arbitrator. There are several sources that publish the decisions of 
arbitrators where the parties agree to publication.29 There is no 
systematic determination of which decisions are published, however, 
because it depends exclusively on party agreement. Arbitration decisions 
are not precedential in the American system, but the parties' expectations 
and the system of arbitral selection have resulted in development of a 
"common law" of arbitration that is followed by most arbitrators.30 
28. The above mentioned description of the labor arbitration procedure can be found in 
COOPER ET AL., supm note 3, at 19-29. 
29. Id at 1021-23. 
30. Id at 285-88. 
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Arbitrators whose decisions are too far outside the mainstream of this 
common law run risk being deemed unacceptable by parties choosing 
arbitrators. 
Unionization in the governmental sector in the United States 
remains much higher than in the private sector.31 Collective bargaining 
law for government employees is established by individual states, with 
only the law for federal employees promulgated by the federal 
government. Arbitration has become a feature of this sector as well, both 
for purposes of deciding issues of contract interpretation and for 
determining what the collective bargaining agreement will be when the 
parties cannot reach agreement in negotiations. The latter form of 
arbitration, known as interest arbitration, is uncommon in the private 
sector where strikes are allowed, but common in the public sector where 
most jurisdictions prohibit strikes.32 Arbitration of grievance disputes in 
the public sector developed later and more slowly than in the private 
sector. The major factor slowing development of arbitration in this sector 
is concern about delegating the authority of the government to unelected 
arbitrators.33 Another factor is the many laws affecting the terms and 
conditions of employment of government employees, which frequently 
relate to or overlap with the provisions of collective bargaining 
contracts.34 These concerns initially caused courts to reject arbitration 
altogether and even after arbitration was accepted, to limit the authority 
of arbitrators by prohibiting arbitration of some disputes and refusing to 
enforce arbitration awards in others.35 While arbitration of public sector 
contract disputes has become more widely accepted over time, courts in 
public sector cases remain less deferential to arbitration.36 
All in all, arbitration as a method of settling labor contract 
interpretation disputes has been relatively noncontroversial since the 
mid-twentieth century in the private sector and in the last twenty years in 
the public sector. Its success was a factor in the increasing consideration 
of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes in the nonumon 
workplace, commonly referred to as employment arbitration. 
31. See Union Affiliation of Employed IMige and Salary Worker.5 by Occupation and 
Industry, supra note 2. 
32. MARTIN H. MALIN ETAL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 611-12, 615 (2d ed. 2011). 
33. Id at 677-78, 699. 
34. Id at 718-50. 
35. Id at 677-78, 718-50. 
36. Id 
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2. Employment Arbitration 
The deference provided to labor arbitration agreements, particularly 
in the private sector, was not applied to other arbitration agreements. 
While arbitration substitutes for "industrial strife" in labor contracts, in 
other cases it substitutes for litigation.37 Accordingly the courts initially 
refused to enforce such agreements at all.38 In 1925, Congress passed the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), making arbitration agreements enforce-
able.39 The statute contains language stating that "nothing herein 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.'"'0 It also significantly limits judicial review of arbitration 
decisions, allowing vacation of the award only on grounds of bias, fraud, 
corruption, prejudicial arbitral misconduct, or where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers.41 
Despite passage of the FAA, the Supreme Court refused to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate claims based on rights created by law, as opposed 
to claims of breach of contract.42 In the 1980s, however, the Court's view 
of arbitration began to change and it began to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate claims based on laws.43 In the early 1990s, this trend moved into 
employment law and the Court began to enforce agreements to arbitrate 
claims under employment law statutes, beginning with the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act in Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane 
Corp.44 The Court concluded that an agreement to arbitration was merely 
an agreement to a different forum, not a waiver of rights.45 Unless the 
statute creating the claim barred arbitration, the Court would order 
arbitration. The Court did not have to deal with the FAA's exclusion for 
contracts of employment, however, because the arbitration provision in 
Gilmerwas not contained in an employment agreement.46 
37. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
38. See MALIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 728. 
39. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1925). 
40. Id§ I. 
41. 9U.S.C.§10(2012). 
42. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953); COOPER ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 739. 
43. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 
(1985); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/ Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989). 
44. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
45. Id at 29. 
46. Id at 25 n.2. 
48 TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 23 
Ten years later in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court was 
faced with an arbitration agreement in an employment contract.47 The 
Court read the exclusion for employment contracts very narrowly, 
holding that it excluded only contracts of transportation workers like the 
expressly mentioned "seamen" and "railroad employees," despite the fact 
that the scope of interstate commerce is substantially broader today.48 
This decision opened the door to widespread adoption and enforcement 
of arbitration agreements in employment. 
Since that time, agreements to arbitrate employment law claims 
have been enforceable, subject to certain limited defenses. One is that 
the statute that gives rise to the dispute does not allow such agreements.49 
Because most employment statutes were passed before such agreements 
were enforceable, however, they typically do not bar arbitration.50 
Although the arbitration agreements are usually imposed on employees 
as a condition of employment, courts have rejected the argument that the 
employee's lack of bargaining power alone is a defense to enforcement.51 
Other defenses to arbitration are that there was no agreement to 
arbitrate52 or that the employee cannot effectively vindicate the statutory 
rights in arbitration.53 In addition, the generally applicable defenses to 
the enforcement of any contract apply.54 In employment arbitration, the 
company chooses the arbitration system. Some agreements limit 
damages, shorten the statute of limitations for filing claims, require the 
employee to pay part of the costs of arbitration, limit the ability to bring a 
class action, permit the employer to choose the arbitrator, or limit 
discovery of evidence in the possession of the other party.55 There is 
much litigation about the enforceability of agreements that use a process 
that is not equivalent to that available in court. Some courts have refused 
to enforce agreements with some or all of these provisions on grounds 
47. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
48. !datll9,121. 
49. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28. 
50. An exception is the whistleblower protections under the Dodd-Frank Act, a financial 
reform bill, which bars predispute agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)). 
51. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. 
52. See, e.g., Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no 
agreement to arbitrate the claims of an employee for sexual assault that occurred after work hours 
in the employee's bedroom in employer-provided housing). 
53. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000) 
(recognizing the defense but finding that the plaintiff failed to establish it). 
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements except "upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"). 
55. MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1058, 1063-64 (2d ed. 
2011). 
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that the contract is unconscionable or that statutory rights cannot be 
vindicated.56 Other courts have ordered arbitration despite the differences 
from litigation57 and still others have liberally construed or modified the 
agreement to make it enforceable.58 Where the provisions are weighted 
too heavily in favor of the employer, however, courts that generally order 
arbitration will allow the employee to bring the claim in court.59 
The Supreme Court has become very favorably inclined to 
enforcing such agreements, despite efforts to resist arbitration by lawyers 
representing employees. In recent years, the Court has decided many 
cases involving arbitration agreements unilaterally imposed on 
employees and consumers and most of the decisions favor arbitration.60 
The Federal Arbitration Act has been found to preempt many state laws 
that limit enforcement of arbitration agreements,61 contrary to the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in other areas where the trend is to give 
more power to the states. Efforts to enact a comprehensive federal 
statute to prohibit imposition of such agreements on employees as a 
condition of employment have been unsuccessful.62 As a result of the 
Supreme Court's decisions, the grounds for refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreements are more limited, and the trend in the lower courts 
is toward enforcement. 
For many years, a 1974 Supreme Court decision appeared to 
prohibit unions from agreeing with employers that employees would 
have to arbitrate legal claims,63 but as the Court became more favorably 
inclined toward arbitration a few lower courts enforced such 
agreements.64 In 2009, without reversing the 1974 decision, the Supreme 
Court held that a union's agreement with an employer to arbitrate 
disputes arising under discrimination laws barred an employee from 
suing the employer in court for discrimination.65 To be enforceable, 
56. Id at 1062, 1067-73. 
57. See id at I 063--64. 
58. Seeidat1060. 
59. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e 
hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules-especially the scheme whereby one party to 
the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel-breaches the contract entered into by the parties."). 
60. See infra notes 90-91, 97 and accompanying text. 
61. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011 ). 
62. Jesse K. Kamens, Arbitration Faimess Act Reinforced To Curb Forced Arbitration !Or 
Consumers, Others, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) (May 24, 2013), http://news.bna.com/clsn/ 
CLSNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=31079129&vname=clasnotallissues&fcn=53&wsh=5069540 
OO&fu=3 l 079129&split=O (subscription required). 
63. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974). 
64. See Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001); Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1996). 
65. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009). 
50 TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 23 
however, the agreement must clearly and unequivocally waive the 
employee's right to litigate.66 Additionally, the Court did not decide 
whether the employee was bound by the arbitration agreement if the 
union refused to arbitrate the employee's claim, which is commonly the 
union's right under the collective bargaining agreement.67 
The Supreme Court has also held that employees who agree to 
arbitration can still bring their cases to administrative enforcement 
agencies, which may bring legal claims in court on the employee's behalf 
despite the arbitration agreement.68 The employee's arbitration agreement 
does not bind the agency, which has a public interest to vindicate in 
bringing the claim.69 Government agencies bring suit only in a very 
small number of cases, however.10 
Employment arbitration in the United States has been far more 
controversial than labor arbitration. It is imposed on individual 
employees without bargaining rights as a condition of employment using 
a system designed by the employer alone. It removes their right to go to 
court to vindicate legal rights. Critics of employment arbitration 
complain that these agreements deprive unsuspecting employees of 
important rights like a jury trial.11 Additionally, courts have enforced 
agreements that limit damages, shorten the statute of limitations for 
bringing claims, and require the employees to pay costs that they would 
not have to pay in court. 72 Critics argue that arbitration will limit public 
exposure of discrimination, decreasing the deterrent effect of the laws 
and allowing patterns of discrimination to continue. A related concern is 
that development of the law may be suppressed, with fewer judicial 
opinions interpreting statutes. Others are concerned that arbitration may 
provide a kind of second class justice especially where there are power 
66. Wright v. Universal Marine Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 ( 1998). 
67. 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 249. 
68. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002). 
69. Id at 295-96. 
70. For example, in 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received 
88,778 charges of discrimination and filed only 133 lawsuits for enforcement. Fiscal l'ear 2014: 
Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTIJNITY COMMISSION 26, 27, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc.plan/upload/20 I 4par.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2014). 
71. Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for 
the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 34-35 (2003). 
72. See, e.g., Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(ordering arbitration, although the agreement reduced the statute of limitations and waived 
punitive damages, and holding that whether the waivers were effective was for the arbitrator to 
decide); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1258-62 (I Ith Cir. 2003) (requiring 
arbitration where the losing party was required to pay the fees of the other party and holding that 
it did not prevent the plaintiff from vindicating his rights under the statute, although he would not 
be required to pay the employer's fees in courts ifhe lost the case). 
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differentials between the parties and no control over arbitrator quality.73 
A related concern is that, unlike labor arbitration, employers will be 
"repeat players" in arbitration while employees will not.74 Thus 
employers may be able to secure more favorable arbitrators because they 
are more knowledgeable about their qualifications, and more favorable 
decisions, because the arbitrator will want to ensure future business.75 
Proponents of arbitration, however, suggest that a quicker, cheaper 
method of dispute resolution may benefit employees, particular those 
with small claims that are unattractive to the plaintiffs' bar because of the 
small legal fees generated.76 While some employees may win large jury 
verdicts in a litigation system, many others cannot get to court because of 
the cost of litigation. Some argue that there is no real evidence of a 
repeat player effect in arbitration and that indeed, employees win 
arbitration cases on a regular basis. They argue that while employees 
may trade off certain rights they gain benefits from agreeing to 
arbitration and it should be permissible. In response to the complaint 
that arbitration should be at the employee's option rather than imposed by 
the employer, arbitration's fans assert that it is inefficient for an employer 
to establish an arbitration system if it cannot insure that employees will 
utilize it. Proponents also urge that there are many incentives for 
complying with the law and the prospect of a large and public jury 
verdict is only one; most employers will comply based on the risk of 
arbitration claims, bad publicity and administrative enforcement, as well 
as to improve employee morale and retention. Finally, some 
commentators have suggested that arbitration is less beneficial for 
employers than may initially appear.77 
Empirical studies of arbitration show mixed results. It is difficult to 
obtain data and difficult to determine how to make accurate comparisons 
73. This concern has abated in the courts but not among arbitration's critics. See Gilmer 
v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (indicating that arbitration is merely a 
different forum that does not entail relinquishing any substantive rights); Jean R. Stemlight, 
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. I 631, 1649-50 (2005); Jean R. 
Stemlight, Disanning Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration 
To Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter 
Stemlight, Disanning Employees]. 
74. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. I, 11-17' 20 (2011 ). 
75. Id 
76. Samuel Estreicher, Satums for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001); Theodore 
J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91 (2001 ). 
77. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using 
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 421-40 (2000). 
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of arbitration and litigation.78 Some employees win arbitration cases, 
although evidence indicates that employee victories are more common in 
cases based on contracts than in cases involving legal claims.79 Labor 
arbitrators under union contracts rule for employees more often than 
employment arbitrators.80 There is some evidence that employees prevail 
more often in arbitration than in court, although the validity and 
significance of this evidence is much debated,81 and recent research 
suggests that the higher win rates are attributable to the inclusion of 
individually negotiated agreements of highly compensated employees. 82 
The evidence also indicates that employees receive greater monetary 
damages in court than arbitration, but the studies do not consider cases 
that settle prior to litigation, which may affect their validity.83 
Additionally, low-wage employees may have more opportunity to pursue 
their claims in arbitration.84 These studies have fueled, though not settled, 
the debate about the use of employment arbitration. 
Among the recent controversies is the enforcement of employment 
arbitration agreements that limit class or collective claims, which involve 
groups of employees or consumers joining together to sue their employer 
or business. Such actions are available under most U.S. employment 
laws.85 They are particularly beneficial where each individual has small 
damages because an individual lawsuit would require the employee to 
spend more to litigate the case than is at stake. If many employees with 
the same claim can join together, the cost of litigation is shared, the 
process is more efficient, and the employer held to account. For the 
employer, class actions can be expensive and time-consuming to 
litigate.86 They may attract media attention and adversely affect a 
78. Stemlight, Disanning Employees, supra note 73, at 16. 
79. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Satums and Rickshaws Revisited· W'lJat Kind of 
Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 64-65, 74 
(2014); Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Adjudication of Workplace Disputes, in LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 361, 380 (Kenneth G. DauSchmidt et al. eds., 2009). 
80. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 79, at 380, 387, 390. 
81. id at 373. 
82. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 79, at 74-76, 81 (showing that win rates and damage 
awards are lower than those in litigated cases, particularly when the individually negotiated 
agreements of high-level employees are separated from employer-mandated arbitration). 
83. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 79, at 383-85. 
84. id at 385, 390. But see Colvin & Pike, supra note 79, at 81-82 (finding most cases in 
arbitration will not be economically viable, leading to a system that is not accessible to 
employees). 
85. See Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 
Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 204-05 (2003). 
86. Deborah A. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet: Av01ding 
Employment Class Actions, 27 EMP. REL. L.J. 5, 20 (2000). 
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company's reputation.87 Accordingly, there is substantial pressure on 
companies to settle such claims.88 These pressures motivate businesses to 
seek ways to avoid class actions. Arbitration agreements off er an 
appealing vehicle to reach such a result, enhanced by recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court.89 
In 2010, the Court ruled in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp. that a party could not be ordered to arbitrate class 
claims unless the arbitration agreement specifically provided for class 
arbitration.90 Then in 2011, the Court held in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion that a state law that invalidated certain arbitration 
agreements that precluded class claims was preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act and thus unenforceable.91 These cases make arbitration 
agreements that ban class actions enforceable, allowing employers to 
escape class action claims. Critics argue that this allows employers to 
avoid liability altogether because the cost will prevent many employees 
from arbitrating individually.92 
A more recent development may make this device less useful to 
employers, however. In January 2012, the National Labor Relations 
Board held that employers who promulgate arbitration agreements that 
prohibit employees from filing class actions in both arbitration and court 
violate the employees' right to engage in concerted activity, which is 
protected by the National Labor Relations Act.93 The court of appeals 
denied enforcement of the decision, however,94 and many other courts 
have refused to follow the decision.95 Nevertheless, the NLRB 
87. Id at 21. 
88. Id at 6, 22-23. 
89. Because these cases were decided under the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs 
arbitration of most employment law claims, they apply in employment cases. See Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. l 05 (2001) (applying the FAA to employment law claims). 
90. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'! Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010). Where the 
parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide whether a class action was permissible under a 
contract that was silent on the issue, however, the Court followed its general policy of deference 
and refused to set aside the arbitrator's interpretation that the agreement allowed class actions. 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013). 
91. 131S.Ct.1740,1748(2011). 
92. Sternlight, Disanning Employees, supra note 73. 
93. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012). The statute does not cover 
government employees, agricultural employees, employees of railroads and airlines, supervisors, 
or managers. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3), (11) (2012); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace 
Corp., 416 U.S. 267, 268-69 (1974). 
94. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(denying enforcement in relevant part). 
95. Id 
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reaffirmed this interpretation of the statute in 2014 in Murphy 011, 
indicating that the agency will continue to invalidate such agreements.96 
Most recently, a 2013 decision by the Supreme Court in an antitrust 
case contributes further to the primacy of arbitration and its ability to 
prevent class actions. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, the Court enforced a class action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement between merchants.97 The Court found that the law did not 
ban class action waivers nor guarantee the right to bring a class claim, 
even if an individual claim would cost more to litigate than was available 
in damages.98 This case seems likely to encourage more employers to use 
arbitration agreements to limit employee class actions and also casts 
doubt on the viability of the defense to arbitration based on inability to 
vindicate a statutory claim in arbitration. 
B. Italian Arbitration 99 
In contrast to the United States, arbitration in the workplace in Italy 
has been limited. Italy's civil law system is more protective of workers 
than U.S. law, and that tradition is reflected in the judicial and legislative 
treatment of arbitration. Much of the legal development relating to 
arbitration has been statutory and only recently has arbitration similar to 
that in the United States been permitted by law. 
Arbitration in Italy was first recognized by the law in 1865. "About 
conciliation and settlement" was the "preliminary title" of the Italian 
code of civil procedure (C.p.c.) that recognized arbitration, allowing 
litigants to opt for an alternative to state judicial power to resolve civil 
disputes. 100 Article 20 sets forth that the "arbiters decide in conformity 
with the rules of law where the settlement may not have authorized them 
to reach such amicable compromise as might have been wished for." 101 
Such wording drew a line between two types of arbitration that 
remains today. Ritual arbitration must conform to the positive rules of 
law, which determine the structure, proceedings, and outcome of the 
process. In ritual arbitration, the award is vested with the same import as 
any decision by a judicial body. In contrast is nonritual arbitration, where 
96. Murphy Oil USA, 361 N.L.R.B. 72 (2014). 
97. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
98. Id at 2309. 
99. The Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law would like to thank Sara 
Lelli for her hard work and time spent during the substantiation of the Italian sources in this 
Article. 
I 00. 4 SALVAlDRE SATTA, COMMENTARIO AL CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVJLE pt. 2, at 162-63 
(1971) (author's translation). 
101. Art. 20 Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c.] (It.) (author's translation). 
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the parties entrust a third party (a sole arbiter or board) to reach such 
agreement as will resolve the controversy that arose between the parties. 
Nonritual arbitration is far less constrained by law. The decisions and 
processes in ritual arbitrations follow the C.p.c., whereas in the case of 
nonritual arbitrations, also known as contractual arbitrations, it is up to 
the arbiters to draw up the parameters of the arbitration, such as the 
processes and rules of the forum. 102 
Arbitration was first introduced in the legal system to resolve 
employment disputes in 1893.103 Act 15 vested the arbitration panel 
committee with a judicial function in controversies with a ceiling of lire 
200, in addition to the prevalent conciliatory function, but left the parties 
free to grant the panel the flexibility of arbitration. 104 Despite this 
development, for many years thereafter both the law and practice 
hindered the use of arbitration in workplace disputes. 
During much of the twentieth century, arbitrations arising from 
individual contracts were permitted, but the law prohibited arbitration 
provisions in collective agreements and arbitrations of individual 
disputes arising from collective agreements. 105 Both legal restrictions on 
individual arbitration106 and suspicions of private justice and its protection 
of workers limited the use of arbitration in the workplace. 101 But, as 
procedure experts point out, some trade unions and employers began to 
experiment with some forms of nonritual conciliation and arbitration by 
including in collective contracts settlement clauses that were in 
derogation of the strict rules of employment legal proceedings, leading to 
legal reform in Act 532, enacted on November 8, 1973.108 
Although this law authorized nonritual arbitration where provided 
by law or contract, it allowed the parties to go to court instead as long as 
they did so within the terms provided by the contract. 109 The law also 
authorized judicial review of the merits of the award for "breach of the 
102. Luigi Biamonti, Arbitrato, in 2 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRIITO 899, 901 (Giuffre ed., 
1958). 
103. CLAUDIO CECCHELLA, C ARBITRATO NELLE CONTROVERSIE DI LAVORO 35 ( 1990). 
104. Id at 37. 
105. Rosario Flammia, Arbitrato /IL Arbitrato e Conciliazione in Materia di Lavoro, in 
ENCICLOPEDIAGIURIDICA 1, 1 (1999). 
106. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1940, in its eighth title dedicated to arbitration 
(articles 806ff-831), provided only for individual arbitration and expressly excluded its 
application to industrial disputes of any kind and to social security issues. Carmine Punzi, 
L'Arbitrato nelle Controversie di Lavoro, Rrv. ARB. 389, 389-90 (2001 ). 
107. GIUSEPPE TARZIA, MANUALE DEL PROCESSO DEL LAVORO 56 (5th ed. 2008). 
I 08. Carmine Punzi, L'Arbitrato in Materia di Lavoro: Fanti e lmpugnaziom; 5 MASS. 
GIUR. LAV: 353, 354 (2010). 
109. See TARZIA, supra note 107, at 57. 
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law or the contracts or collective agreements."110 As a result of the broad 
scope of judicial review, the parties rarely used arbitration but instead 
went directly to court except in cases involving dismissals of top 
managers. 111 
The move toward true arbitration began at the end of the twentieth 
century, with legislation that expanded the availability of arbitration 
while still retaining for the parties the right to go to court on any claim. 
In 1990, individual dismissals became subject to nonritual arbitration 
after compulsory conciliation if both parties agreed. 112 The legislature 
later broadened the controversies on which arbitration was permissible. 113 
The new provisions, part of the C.p.c., 114 authorized nonritual arbitration 
after mandatory conciliation115 where provided by national contracts or 
collective accords. In addition, the legislature abrogated the provision 
from the 1973 law allowing broad judicial review. 116 Article 412 section 
4 limited review to a single employment tribunal judge in the jurisdiction 
where the controversy occurred.111 The time limit filing the appeal was 
110. Legge 11 agosto 1973, n. 533 in G.U. 13 Sept. 1973, n. 237 art. 5 § 2 (It.) (author's 
translation). 
111. Antonio Vallebona, Una Buona Svolta def Diritto def Lavoro: JI "Co/legato" 2010, 4 
MASS. GIUR. LAV. 210, 211 (2010). One of the fathers of labor law called this law "the slaying of 
arbitration," noting that the unions and their lawyers were indispensable in its passage but 
effectively rendered arbitration a nullity by the limitations. See Gino Giugni, JI Dintto def Lavoro 
negli Anni 80, 5 GIOR. DIR. LAV. REL. IND. 382, 400 (1982); Gino Giugni, lntervista, 411 RIV. IT. 
DIR. LAV. 438 ( 1992) (author's translation). For further analysis of the restrictions of the law, see 
Vallebona, supra, at 210, 214. 
112. See Legge 11 maggio 1990, n. I 08 in G.U. 11 maggio 1990, n. I 08 art. 5 § 6 (It.). 
113. See Art. 808(3) C.p.c. (It.), translated in SOMONA GROSS & MARIA c. PAGNI, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ITALIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 73 (20 I 0) ("The parties may agree in 
writing, that in lieu of the provisions of article 824-bis, the controversy may be decided by arbiters 
by contractual determination. In all other cases, the provisions of the present title shall apply."). 
114. See id. art. 412(3)-(4). 
115. As in the case of arbitration for individual dismissals, arbitration must be preceded by 
conciliation, a prerequisite to any legal action regarding employment. See Francesco P. Luiso, II 
Tentativo Obbligatorio di Conci/iazione nelle Controversie di Lavoro, Riv. IT. DIR. LAV. 375 
(1999); Bruno Capponi, Le Fonti degli Arbitrati in Materia di Lavoro, 5 MASS. G1uR. LAV. 357 
(20 I 0). If conciliation fails, the parties decide (I) the method of initiating an arbitration request 
and the period of time the other party has to agree; (2) the composition of the arbitration board 
and the procedure for the appointment of the president and members; (3) the forms and methods 
of any investigation; (4) the deadline for the award and notification to the parties; and (5) the 
arbitrators' pay. The nonritual arbitral procedure remains an alternative form of resolution as the 
parties are at all times free to opt for court action or to request the arbitral board of right or any 
other form of arbitration expressly provided at law (e.g., the one previously mentioned for 
individual dismissals). Id. at 358. 
116. See Decreto legislativo 31 marzo 1998, n. 80, in G.U. 8 aprile 1998, n. 65 (It.). 
117. Art. 412(4) C.p.c. (It.). 
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thirty days from notification of the award and the judge's decision was 
final. 118 
The judge could set aside the award: 
(1) If the arbitration agreement was invalid or the arbiters 
exceeded their authority and the exception was raised in the 
arbitral proceedings; 
(2) If the arbiters were not appointed as required by the arbitration 
agreement; 
(3) If the award was rendered by an ineligible arbiter as defined in 
article 812; 
(4) If the arbiters did not stay within the conditions set by the 
parties for the award to be valid; 
( 5) If the arbitral proceedings did not allow both parties the 
opportunity to present their case and to reply to the opponent's 
case, an essential principle in the Italian legal system that we 
have translated as confrontation. 119 
The arbitral award is expressly defined as a "contractual award," so it 
cannot be overturned for breach of the rules of law and collective rules 
pertaining to the merits of the controversy, but solely for the reasons set 
forth above. Thus, the review is more similar to that in the United States 
with the exception of confrontation, which is not required in U.S. 
arbitration. 
Despite legislative changes that allow more arbitration, 
controversies may be decided by arbiters only where the law or the 
collective contracts and accords provide for it. Also, unlike the United 
States, the parties always remain free to reject arbitration for any 
particular dispute and go to court, despite a contractual or legal provision 
providing for arbitration. Even after the law changed, legal scholarship 
heavily slanted in favor of workers argued that controversy over the 
"validity of the award" still referred to the violation of rules at law 
pertaining to the merits of the controversy.12° Collective agreements lost 
no time insuring that awards could still be challenged on the merits in 
court, thus depriving the legislation of the intended arbitral finality. 121 
118. /dart.412. 
119. Id (author's translation). 
120. See Decreto legislativo 29 ottobre 1998, n. 387, in G.U. 7 novembre 1998, n. 261 (It.) 
(author's translation); Vallebona, supra note 111, at 210. The serious limitations to the arbitral 
institution were also stressed by Giuseppe Tarzia, who noted that the award was less binding than 
the statement of the minutes of conciliation drawn up at the office of the union or in front of the 
commission. See TARZIA, supra note I 07, at 69. 
121. See Vallebona, supra note 111, at 211. 
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The latest development in Italian arbitration occurred in 2010, in the 
"employment reform package."122 This law provided for true arbitration, 
enabling the parties to choose between public and private avenues of 
remedy for controversies that have arisen and that may arise in the future. 
Nonritual arbitration is allowed, on the basis of collective accord 
provisions agreed to by the more representative trade associations and 
certified by the commissions set up by the Provincial Employment 
Bureau. Arbitration may proceed in front of arbitral chambers instituted 
by certification bodies123 or, last but not least, in front of a board set up at 
the instigation of the parties to the controversy. 
In contrast to U.S. arbitration, the statute contains more detailed 
prescriptions regarding the arbitration procedure, which in the United 
States is left to the parties. The previous text of article 412 section 4 
C.p.c., was replaced by the wording: "without prejudice to the right of 
each of the respective parties to take legal action and to resort to the 
conciliation and arbitration procedure provided at law, the controversies 
listed under article 409 may also be submitted to the nonritual 
conciliation and arbitration board instituted in the following terms," 
which state procedural rules. 124 The petitioner must reference the points 
of law in support of the claim and may also include a request to decide ex 
aequo et bona, which means in respect to the general principles of the 
legal system and the regulatory principles regarding the subject matter, 
also deriving from EU law. 125 
If the respondent accepts the conciliation and arbitration procedure, 
it appoints its own arbiter, who has thirty days from notification of the 
appointment to select, with the other arbiter, the president (a neutral 
arbiter) and the place for the meeting of the board. If the arbiters do not 
agree, the petitioner may request the president of the court of the district 
122. Legge 13agosto2010,n.151,inG.U. 11 settembre2010,n.215(1t.). 
123. The Biagi reform (Legge 14 febbraio 2003, n. 30, in G.U. 26 febbraio 2003, n. 47 
(It.), and Decreto legislativo 10 settembre 2003, n. 276, in G.U. 9 ottobre 2003, n. 159 (It.)), 
introduced certification bodies into the legal system to reduce legal disputes under collective 
agreements regarding the status of workers as employees or independent contractors. The 
purpose of certification is to assure the free will of the parties in signing the contract. The 
certification procedure, supervised by an appointed commission, starts with agreement of both 
parties and must contain the specifications of the contract for which certification is requested. 
The procedure ends by an ordinance of either certification or rejection, determining whether the 
contract is for employment or independent contractor status. A positive certification makes it 
impossible to question the determination of worker status absent a legal decision on the issue. 
124. Art. 412(4) C.p.c. (It.) (author's translation). 
125. Id§ 2. 
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to appoint the neutral arbiter. The controversy is decided within twenty 
days of the hearing by the issuance of an award. 126 
The award of the arbiters, duly authenticated, carries "the force of 
law on the parties," the same as article 13 72 of the civil code dealing 
with contracts. 121 Controversies about the validity of the nonritual arbitral 
award, which may be challenged within thirty days of notification, are 
decided by review of the court with first-level jurisdiction. Once the 
deadline for appeal has expired, if the parties have declared in writing 
that they accept the decision or, if the challenge is rejected by the 
tribunal, the judge, upon request of the parties and having verified the 
procedural propriety of the award, declares it valid and enforceable. 128 
The noteworthy change allows the parties that opt for nonritual 
arbitration to agree that the award may not be challenged in front of a 
judge for violation of collective contracts and accords and rules of law 
pertaining to the merit of the controversy, as is permitted in ritual forms 
of arbitration.129 Thus, employment disputes resolved by contractual 
arbitration are subject to challenge, as in article 808 section 3 C.p.c., only 
where the arbitral convention is invalid, the arbiters overstepped the 
limits of the mandate, the appointment of arbiters was not in 
conformance with convention, the arbiters had legal incapacity, the 
arbiters violated the rules set down by the parties, or the requirement of 
confrontation is violated. Such requirements are essentially procedural 
and do not bear on the merits, similar to the United States. With this 
limitation on the scope of review, however, came a prohibition on 
arbitrating dismissal cases. 
Under the 2010 reform, parties to an individual employment 
contract are also allowed (under section 8 article 31, Act 183 of 2010) to 
agree to nonritual arbitration for any controversy that may arise from the 
contract, precluding in advance any recourse to legal action. 130 Such a 
clause is enforceable only if "certified," in order to ensure "the effective 
will of the parties to assign to arbiters any such controversy as may arise 
from the employment contract."131 Such a covenant reproduces the 
126. Id§ 10. 
127. See id Article 1372 C.c. provides: "The contract has the force of law between the 
parties. It can be solved only by mutual consent or according to reasons allowed by law. The 
contract has no effect with respect to third parties." Art. 1372 C.c. (It.) (author's translation). 
128. Art. 412(4) § 10 C.p.c. (It.). 
129. Antonio Vallebona, L'Arbitrato lnitua/e nel Sistema de/ Diritto de/ Lavoro Dopa ii 
"Co/legato, "5 MASS. GIUR. LAV. 362, 363 (2010). 
130. Art. 412(4) § I 0 C.p.c. (It.). 
131. For the certification procedure, see sources cited supra note 123. 
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aspects of arbitration set forth in article 808, section 1 C.p.c., which may 
be included in the contract or in a separate document. 
Doubts about the constitutionality of the form of the arbitration 
clause seem groundless. Some critics have argued that the new 
procedure would clash with article 101 of the Constitution providing "no 
special judges may be instituted," and with article 24, which guarantees 
free access to a judge for the protection of one's rights. 132 
In no way, however, does the new legal procedure impinge on the 
parties' right to call upon the judicial authority and to resort to the range 
of conciliation and arbitration procedures provided by law. Any party to 
the employment contract may refuse to agree to an arbitration procedure 
suggested by the other party, because arbitration remains, in every form, 
an option for the parties and not mandated by law.133 
Under labor law, article 412 section 4 regulates invalidation of 
nonritual arbitration as follows: "Controversies regarding the validity of 
the non-ritual arbitral award pursuant to article 808 section 3 C.p.c., are 
decided by a single employment judge."134 Such wording caused some 
concern that use of the term "validity" might authorize judicial review of 
the merits of the controversy. Yet, such position is untenable because the 
term "validity" is simply meant to connect nonritual arbitration with the 
model of invalidation, which is exclusively procedural. 135 And in any 
event, invalidation of an arbitral award is lawful where it violates 
inalienable provisions at law and in collective accords. 136 
Lastly, the new article 412 section 4 C.p.c. enables the parties to ask 
arbiters to decide ex aequo et bono. 131 Because, according to the same 
provision, a decision ex aequo et bona must be handed down "with 
respect to the general principles of the legal system and the regulatory 
principles of the subject matter, such as flow from EU law," court 
practice has found that "there does not seem to exist a big difference, 
132. Article 24 of the Italian Constitution provides, "Everyone can take legal action to 
protect their rights and legitimate interests." Art. 24 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (author's 
translation). 
133. On that issue and on good practice in the use of nonritual arbitration, see Vallebona, 
supra note 111, at 216. Cf Capponi, supra note 115, at 357. 
134. Art. 412 C.p.c. (It.) (author's translation). 
135. For a brief compilation of the issues raised by the new nonritual arbitration system, 
see Capponi, supra note 115, at 361. 
136. For example, provisions regarding health and safety, the right to organize, a decent 
salary, and all the rights directly or indirectly protected by the Constitution. See Eduardo Ghera 
& Lucia Valente, Un Primo Commentoa/ CoflegatoLavoro, 12 MASS. GIUR. LAV. 869 (2010). 
137. This concept is similar to equity in the American legal system. 
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considering the transactional nature of non-ritual awards, between award 
at law and award ex aequo et bono."138 
In summary, arbitration that is more final and binding is now 
possible under Italian law, with judicial review for procedural defects in 
the decision. However, the parties always remain free to avoid arbitration 
and resort to the courts for enforcement of either contractual or legal 
rights. 
Having reviewed the law and practice of workplace arbitration 
under the U.S. and Italian systems, it is now possible to consider the 
similarities and differences between the systems. 
IV. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
A. Companson Between the Two Systems 
The foregoing discussion of arbitration in the labor and employment 
sector in Italy and the United States reveals a few similarities, but far 
more differences between the two countries. This Part will first discuss 
the similarities and then the differences, reflecting on the reasons for the 
differences. It is clear that each system has evolved in its own way based 
on the unique nature of the legal system and the culture of the workplace. 
Laws in both Italy and the United States authorized arbitration long 
before it developed as a practice in the employment field. In both 
countries, there has been resistance to arbitration in the labor and 
employment law arena, although arbitration is far more widely accepted 
today in the United States than in Italy. And arbitration is a voluntary 
process in both countries, although employees in the United States may 
have no real voice in whether to arbitrate employment claims. In both 
countries, arbitration is quicker than litigation in most cases, but that has 
not convinced most parties with a choice, outside of the collective 
bargaining context in the United States and highly paid employees in 
both countries, to adopt arbitration to resolve most disputes. Judicial 
review is limited to procedural violations rather than the merits in both 
countries, with the exception of ritual arbitration in Italy. Finally, in both 
countries, there are legal limitations on arbitrating certain types of 
claims. 
Far more significant than the similarities are the differences 
between the two countries. Some of these differences are rooted in the 
differing legal traditions, with the United States being a common law 
country and Italy a civil law country. Thus most, though certainly not all, 
138. Ghera & Valente, supra note 136, at 869 (author's translation). 
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of the development in U.S. arbitration has been in collective bargaining 
and the courts, while in Italy it is in legislative enactments. Additionally, 
Italy has a much stronger tradition of protecting workers' rights in both 
the courts and the legislature. This tradition and the political force that 
keeps it in place have resisted the spread of arbitration, because the 
courts are viewed as protectors of workers' rights. 
One major difference is that arbitration under collective bargaining 
agreements, known as labor arbitration, has, for over half a century, been 
widely accepted in the United States to resolve disputes between unions 
and employers about the meaning and application of the agreement. 
Both labor and management have accepted this system as an effective 
substitute for both economic action, such as the strike, and judicial 
enforcement. It is used almost exclusively to enforce collective 
bargaining agreements. 
No similar acceptance of arbitration is evident in Italy. This may 
reflect in part the different labor relations systems in the two countries, 
with the United States more clearly separating contract and law. 139 The 
U.S. labor arbitration system evolved at a time when there were few legal 
rights for employees. Almost all rights came from the negotiated 
agreement. Further, in the United States just cause protection from 
termination remains a contractual protection, commonly available in the 
private sector almost exclusively to employees covered by a union 
contract,140 while in Italy such protection exists by law. A related 
explanation is the focus of U.S. unions on what has been called 
"industrial unionism" or "bread and butter" unionism. 141 While there has 
almost always been a more radical element in the American labor 
movement, over time it has diminished in size and the philosophy of 
business unionism prevailed.142 The focus of most unions has been to 
negotiate and enforce favorable terms and conditions of employment 
with their employer, with the primary enforcement mechanism being the 
grievance and arbitration procedure. 143 
Under the Italian legal system, there is no distinction between rights 
based on the law and rights based on the contract because according to 
139. For an analysis of the detrimental effects of this separation for employees, see 
generally Stone, supra note 2. 
140. The exception is the state of Montana, which has a statute requiring just cause for 
termination. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 39-2-904 (2013). 
141. KENNETH DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 34, 
84 (2014). 
142. Id at 34-38, 71-74, 83-85. 
143. Id at 84. For a criticism of labor arbitration as detrimental to employee rights, see 
Stone, supra note 2, at 629-3 I . 
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article 1372 of the civil code, "the contract has the force of law between 
the parties."144 Instead, there is distinction between laws governing 
contracts, which may provide for mandatory or nonmandatory rules. 
Provisions of labor law are in most cases mandatory. The exemption 
from mandatory rules is generally permitted only if it benefits the 
employee. Some rules allow limited flexibility, those related to working 
hours for example, but the general rules (vacation, illness, pregnancy, 
birth of a child, rest, right to strike, and especially those related to the 
termination of the employment relationship) are mandatory.145 
Indeed, the mandatory nature of the right to strike in Italy illustrates 
another significant difference between the two systems. In Italy, any 
limitation on the right to strike arising from an arbitration agreement 
might violate the Italian law barring "anti-union activity" by the 
employer. In such cases, the union is entitled to bring a claim before the 
tribunal, composed of one judge, in order to have the union-busting 
ceased and the status quo restored.146 The court injunction has indirect 
impact on the individual workers' positions (for instance, reinstatement 
to their jobs if the antiunion conduct of the company resulted in 
dismissal). The court injunction, which is issued at the end of a quick 
procedure, may be contested by the employer before the tribunal. 147 
While the United States also prohibits discrimination based on union 
activity as well as other interference with such rights, 148 limits on striking 
based on arbitration agreements are not considered violations of the law. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a contract that provides for 
arbitration of disputes implicitly includes a prohibition on the right to 
strike, even if the parties did not negotiate any such limits, and despite 
the express legal protection for the right to strike.149 
Because the Italian system does not utilize what is known in the 
United States as labor arbitration, the comparison between the two 
systems is meaningful only in relation to employment arbitration, which 
for both jurisdictions has as its object workers' rights provided by law or 
contract. 
144. Art. 1372 C.c. (It.) (author's translation). 
145. See Decreto Legislativo 8 aprile 2003, n. 66, in G.U. 14 aprile 2003, n. 87 (It.); 
Decreto Legislativo 26 marzo 2001, n. 151, in G.U. 26 aprile 2001, n. 96 (It.); art. 40 Cost. (It.); 
Legge 15 luglio 1966, n. 604, in G.U. 6 agosto 1966, n. 195 (It.); Legge 20 maggio 1970, n. 300, 
in G.U. 27 maggio 1970, n. 131 (It.). 
146. See L. n. 30011970 art. 28, § I. 
147. Id art. 28, § 3. 
148. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (2012). 
149. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). 
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Arbitration of legal disputes150 between individual employees and 
employers is still resisted by many in the United States. Most academic 
commentators have been critical of the judicial trend toward enforcement 
of unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements. 151 Similarly, when 
expressly questioned about arbitration, most employees support it only 
where the system is fair and the majority of them oppose mandatory 
arbitration of legal claims as a condition of employment. 152 Courts, 
however, have widely accepted and enforced "agreements" to arbitrate all 
disputes related to employment imposed unilaterally by employers on 
individual employees without bargaining power. 
The explanation for the different approach to employment 
arbitration in Italy and the United States is rooted largely in differences in 
the judicial systems. While the courts in Italy actively protect the rights 
of workers, the courts in the United States, in particular the Supreme 
Court, which has driven much of the move toward arbitration, are far 
more inclined to support business. 153 A recent empirical analysis of 
judicial decisions in the Supreme Court from 1946-2011 concluded that 
in the 1960s there was a decline in the Court's support of business 
interests, but the probusiness inclination began to increase with the 
Burger Court in 1969. 154 While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts ( 1969-
2004) were favorable to business, the Roberts Court, which began in 
2005, has exceeded the two previous Courts in its probusiness 
orientation.155 Indeed, five of the ten Justices most favorable to business 
in the time period of the study are current members of the Roberts 
Court. 156 The study also demonstrated that justices appointed by 
Democratic presidents, who would generally be expected to be less 
150. As distinguished from contractual disputes. 
151. Jean Sternlight, Is the US. Out on a Limb? Comparing the US. Approach to 
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 831, 837-39 (2002); Matthew W. Finkin, Privatization ofWrongfiJJ Dismissal Protection 
in Comparative Perspective, 37 INDUS. L.J. 149, 166-67 (2008). 
152. Finkin, supra note 151, at 166. 
153. See Etwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court atAge Three, 54 WAYNEL. REV. 947, 962 
(2008) (calling the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Roberts the most probusiness court 
since the 1930s); Sternlight, supra note 151, at 855-56 (suggesting corporate influence as an 
explanation for the differing acceptance of arbitration in the United States and most other 
countries); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to 
Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983, 1008 (2008) (acknowledging the Court as probusiness in 
certain respects but suggesting it is not extremely so). 
154. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013). 
155. Id 
156. Id 
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favorable to business, have, over time, become more supportive of 
business interests. 157 
A subsequent analysis of the 2011-12 term of the Court concluded 
that the decisions of that term, including both consumer158 and 
employment cases, favored business even more clearly than decisions in 
earlier terms of the Roberts Court.159 Consistent with the earlier study, 
analysis of the 2011-12 term showed that even liberal leaning justices 
ruled with business in a number of cases where there was a reasonable 
argument on the other side of the case. 160 
In addition to probusiness leanings, an alternative, or perhaps 
complementary, explanation of the Roberts Court's rulings from a more 
conservative commentator is the Court's view that litigation, and 
particularly complex litigation, is not an effective method of resolving 
disputes. 161 A somewhat similar explanation is offered by Professor 
Matthew Bodie, who suggests that the Roberts Court supports private 
enforcement of law, including compliance efforts by employers' human 
resources departments, in lieu of litigation. 162 While Professor Bodie 
does not focus on arbitration, deferring disputes to arbitration is 
consistent with a focus on shifting from litigation to employer 
enforcement of legal norms. 
A third plausible explanation for the Supreme Court's infatuation 
with arbitration is that the Court is simply clearing its docket of cases by 
enforcing agreements for private justice.163 Professor Finkin argues that 
this is the most persuasive explanation of the shift in the Court's view of 
arbitration because the corporate influence on the Court is, at best, 
157. Id at 1472-73. 
158. Several of the cases that impact employment arbitration were consumer cases 
applicable to employment law because both arise under the FAA. See supm text accompanying 
note 89. 
159. Corey Ciochetti, The Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business: The Significant 
Business Impact of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court Tenn, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 385, 419-
36, 444, 460-63 (2013) (analyzing the 2011-12 term of the Court and concluding that while prior 
Roberts Court terms were not uniformly probusiness, the term analyzed was quite clearly 
probusiness). The author also found that the Court both narrowed and expanded statutes and 
constitutional provisions to reach the decisions favorable to business. Id at 461. 
160. Id at 460-61. 
161. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at Age Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1015, 1025 (2008) (acknowledging the Court's probusiness bent but suggesting that a more 
persuasive explanation for the Court's decision is its skepticism about the value oflitigation). 
162. Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159, 161-62 (2013). 
163. Finkin, supm note 151, at 167 (quoting IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 
172 (1992)). 
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indirect. 164 Further, the judicial shift to enforcement of arbitration 
agreements coincides with the expansion of judicial claims available to 
employees, making reducing the docket more attractive. 165 
Each of these rationales has some force as an explanation for the 
extraordinary acceptance of employment arbitration by the Supreme 
Court, which has driven acceptance by other courts. Depending on the 
particular case, the lineup of justices favoring arbitration may vary, based 
on the views of the justices and the countervailing arguments. 166 The 
combination of probusiness orientation and the appeal of alternatives to 
litigation has led to law that permits employers to force employees into 
arbitration for both contractual and legal rights, and to restrict their 
ability to bring claims on a class basis. Further, the fact that the 
opponents of arbitration have not been able to obtain legislative reversal 
of the Court decisions suggests that the power of business and the 
weakness of the employee/consumer lobby have an influence on the 
acceptance of employment arbitration. The failure legislative efforts may 
also reflect a lack of widespread knowledge or active concern about the 
impact of arbitration on employees and consumers. 167 The lack of class 
consciousness in the United States and the reduced influence of labor 
unions exacerbates this absence of focus on the loss of rights. 
In contrast to the United States, Italian law secures the right of each 
party to bring a claim before the judicial authority, whether asserting a 
violation of law or contract, and to use the different procedures of 
conciliation and arbitration provided by law. Each party can always 
reject a proposal for arbitration advanced by the other party, because 
arbitration, in all forms, is a free choice of the parties, not imposed by 
law. For this reason, the agreement to arbitrate must be expressed by the 
164. Id at 165. Professor Finkin also argues that the votes of individual justices on 
arbitration cases do not always track the political views of the appointing president, which is 
consistent with the findings of scholars analyzing the business orientation of the Supreme Court. 
Id Perhaps, however, that fact does not completely denigrate business orientation as an 
explanation for the Court's decisions but instead shows the pervasiveness of business influence, 
particularly when combined with the interest in reducing court dockets. 
165. Id at 168. 
166. For example, the more recent cases restricting class actions and allowing unions to 
waive employee rights to litigate are largely 5-4 or 5-3 (Justice Sotomayor recused herself in two 
of the cases), with the conservatives in the majority and the more liberal or moderate justices in 
dissent. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. 
Anima!Feeds Int'! Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (20 IO); Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 
2304 (2013); 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
167. Several nonprofit organizations have recently launched an effort to educate 
consumers and employees about the impact of arbitration agreements that are often ignored or 
hidden from those affected. See Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (2014), 
http://www.afj.org/multimedia/first-Monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print. 
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employee in relation to each dispute and arbitration clauses are not 
allowed in employment contracts as in the United States. 
The exception in Italy is the recent Act 183 of 2010, which allows 
nonritual arbitration,168 similar to employment arbitration in the United 
States, in limited circumstances. Under this new law, the following 
rigorous conditions must be met: 
(1) the arbitration clauses must have been established by cross-sector 
agreements or collective bargaining agreements signed by the most 
representative organizations of employers and employees at national 
level; 
(2) the certification bodies before which the arbitration clauses have to 
be signed must have verified the actual intent of the parties and the 
clause can't be signed before the expiration of any probationary 
period or, if none, at least 30 days after the beginning of the 
employment contract; and 
(3) disputes relating to dismissal cannot be subject to arbitration 
clauses. 169 
In contrast to the American system, even this limited Italian 
exception for contractual arbitration agreements seems designed to 
protect vulnerable employees and insure that arbitration agreements are 
truly voluntary. Only labor unions, with more power than individual 
employees, can enter into such agreements. Moreover, arbitration of 
claims relating to dismissal is not allowed, thereby preventing employees 
from sacrificing or limiting their most important legal protections. In the 
American system, unions can also waive employee rights to litigate, 
including legal claims relating to termination, but the most vulnerable 
employees are those without unions and they have no protections from 
compelled arbitration. 
Despite the limited acceptance of arbitration enacted in 2010, the 
Italian labor market reform of 2012 does not contain any reference to 
arbitration, showing a disregard for this institution.110 The brief 
experience of the 2012 Reform confirmed the existence of an extreme 
resistance in Italy towards forms of private jurisdiction, resulting from a 
"statist culture" grown mainly by the CGIL (left-leaning trade union) and 
168. Nonritual arbitration need not provide precisely the same procedures as the courts, 
and there is more flexibility in applying the law. Comparatively, this is similar to arbitration of 
legal claims in the United States. 
169. See Legge 4 novembre 2010, n. 183, in G.U. 9 novembre 2011, n. 262, art. 31, § 10 
(It.) (author's translation). 
170. See Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92, in G.U. 3 luglio 2012, n. 153 (It.). 
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the expectation created by judges convinced that they must protect 
employees. 111 
What most distinguishes employment arbitration in the United 
States from arbitration in Italy is the ability of U.S. employers not only to 
require the worker to agree to arbitration, but also to condition 
employment on the signing of clauses that limit rights provided by law, 
such as caps on damages, reduction of limitation periods, or limits on 
available discovery. These clauses would be absolutely void in the Italian 
legal system and might also constitute the crime of extortion, as defined 
by article 629 of the penal code: "Whoever, by violence or threats, 
forcing another person to do or omit anything, procures for himself or 
others an unjust profit and a detriment of others shall be punished with 
imprisonment between one and five years."112 
The problem of arbitration clauses that limit class actions, which 
carries great importance in the United States, is entirely absent from 
Italian labor law. In Italy, the class action, which was introduced in 2007 
by Act 244, is available to consumers or users who suffer damages from 
signing form contracts, pursuant to article 1342 of the civil code, or as a 
result of noncontractual torts, unfair trade practices, or anticompetitive 
trade behavior. 113 It does not apply to the employment contract. 
In addition, article 103 of the C.p.c. of 1942, provides, "More 
parties can act or be sued in the same process, when a connection exists 
between the causes that are presented in terms of the object or the title on 
which they depend, or when the decision depends partially or entirely, on 
the resolution of the same issues." Based on this rule, there are cases in 
which a large number of petitions are filed in a single case. With one 
judicial claim, a number of employees of the same employer may bring a 
variety of individual petitions, when the connection described above 
exists. A common example is collective redundancies caused by the 
employer's organization, while a public sector example is legal actions 
alleging violation of the rules on recruitment examinations brought by 
171. See Lorenzo Zoppoli, Certificazione dei Contratti di Lavoro e Arbitrato: Le Liaisons 
Dangereuses 24 (C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" IT, Working Paper No. 102, 2010); 
Piergiovanni Alleva & Giovanni Naccari, "Legge Sacconi''.· un Fascio di lncostituzionalita, IL 
MANIFESW (25 marzo 2010), http://www.dirittisocialiecittadinanza.org/Documenti/un%20fascio 
%20di%20incostituzionalita.pdf; F. Scarpelli, Giurisdizione, Tutela dei Diritti, Arbitrato: 
L'Ossessione def Legislatore di Centrodestra, Norn INFORMATIVE (I aprile 2010), 
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/6460SCARPELLl_GJURIS.pdf. 
172. Cass. Pen., sez. VI, I luglio 2010, n.32525 (quoting a recent decision by the Supreme 
Court that found an employer guilty of extortion when it required an employee to provide a 
presigned letter of resignation as a condition of hiring); art. 629 Codice penale [C.p.] (It.) 
(author's translation). 
173. See Legge 24 dicembre 2007, n. 244, in G.U. 28 dicembre 2007, n. 300 (It.). 
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the excluded candidates. But this is not a class action and the procedure 
is identical to the ordinary procedure, be it one actor, five, or one 
hundred. 
B. Learning from One Another 
From an Italian perspective, it is difficult to answer the question of 
what the Italian system could draw from the U.S. experience. The 
resolution of employment disputes in the United States offers a variety of 
methods that appear to respond mainly to practical needs. In the United 
States, the authoritativeness of arbitration does not seem to be called into 
question. This result has been accomplished primarily by the courts. In 
contrast to Italy, the legislation relating to arbitration has not changed. 
This does not imply, however, that workers and their lawyers do not 
challenge individual arbitration agreements imposed when the worker is 
in a state of maximum weakness, that is, at the time of hiring. 
In the Italian civil law system, judges play a key role in turning the 
"law in the books" into "law in action," with long and "creative" 
explanations of the judgments. Paradoxically, excessive and lengthy 
reasoning that explains the judgment has turned the judge from being the 
mouth of the law to the subject who gives voice to the law, and becomes 
master of the meaning of the rule of law. 
The more interpretation defines the meaning of the rules, the more 
crucial the role of the judge in identifying the authentic content of the 
right in accordance with the rules defined by the case law. If one adds to 
this the general perception--experienced especially since the l 970s-
that the Italian courts in labor cases are biased in favor of the employees 
because they are considered the weaker party to the relationship, it is 
easy to understand why in Italy, where the employee has the right to 
refuse arbitration, the use of arbitration is limited: usually employees 
bring claims in Labor Court because they think they can count on a judge 
who favors them. 
For this reason, arbitration in Italy is used primarily in cases of high 
asset value, occurring in legal relationships characterized by significant 
economic exchanges. The parties in these relationships have a notable 
lack of confidence in ordinary justice, deemed incapable of deciding the 
interests at stake, both for cultural inadequacy and excessive bureaucracy. 
The judge's role is crucial in American law as well, but that power 
has been exercised to interpret the law to force employees into 
arbitration. The United States could learn from the Italian system a 
measure caution regarding protection of employee rights. While the 
American courts are not considered proemployee, the American jury 
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system provides a counterweight to the relatively proemployer orientation 
of many courts. Conventional wisdom is that employees fare better in 
front of juries because jurors relate to the "little guy" suing the big 
employer. Studies show that employees in the United States generally 
fare better in court than in arbitration on statutory claims such as 
discrimination, and, in addition, many cases settle favorably to the 
employee before trial. 174 Jurors also tend to award more damages to 
employees than arbitrators in these cases. 115 Thus, it would seem that 
given an informed choice, many U.S. employees, like Italian employees, 
would choose to go to court rather than arbitrate claims based on 
employment statutes. 
Even in the Italian system, however, arbitration is utilized in cases 
involving high asset value. Interestingly, the data on the American 
system shows that higher paid employees fare better in arbitration on 
their employment contract claims. 116 These employees are sufficiently 
powerful to compel an employer to negotiate an employment contract 
and thus, also likely to be able to hire an experienced lawyer to arbitrate 
their claim. For these employees, as in Italy, a choice of arbitration may 
be rational. For most other U.S. employees, however, employment 
arbitration is not a choice and may require giving up statutory rights with 
a reduced chance of prevailing on any claim. On the other side of the 
equation, however, is the fact that many U.S. employees cannot find legal 
representation for either litigation or arbitration. 177 This fact has 
convinced some commentators to advocate an arbitral forum that is 
easier for employees to navigate without legal representation.118 
Taking into account the Italian concern for employees' rights, the 
United States might modify the employment arbitration system. There 
are several possible options. Like Italy, arbitration could be a choice for 
both parties to each dispute. Alternatively, U.S. law could make the 
contractual choice for employment arbitration truly optional, refusing to 
enforce agreements imposed as a condition of employment. This might 
be accompanied by a requirement that the employer provide information 
to enable employees to make an informed choice, such as details about 
the system of arbitration and what the employee loses by foregoing 
litigation for arbitration or vice versa. Another possibility would be for 
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the government to provide information to enable employees to make an 
informed choice about arbitration.119 A final option would be to impose 
express and consistent legal standards on any arbitration system adopted 
by employers to insure that the system is not unduly favorable to the 
employer. Any of these options could be instituted by legislation. 
Because of the current interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
however, legislation would have to be enacted at the federal level.180 
Given the infatuation of the U.S. courts with arbitration, the latter 
might be the most palatable option. Many arbitration providers already 
have standards, although they are not legally enforceable.181 Employers 
remain free to choose a provider with standards favorable to the 
employer. Additionally, courts have imposed some standards under the 
Federal Arbitration Act. 182 Existing standards vary by court, however, and 
their unpredictability leads to litigation. Mandatory standards imposed 
by legislation would insure some level of protection of employee rights 
while still providing the alternative forum that the courts desire. Such a 
result is unlikely, however, without a more active and effective lobbying 
effort by advocates of employees and consumers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Italian and American arbitration systems have evolved in the 
context of the very different legal systems and cultures in the two 
countries. As a result, it seems unlikely that the Italian system will draw 
from the American system. Despite laws authorizing arbitration that is 
less tethered to the law, the strong belief that the judicial system is the 
best protector of employee rights limits its use except in cases of high-
level employees. The United States could learn from the Italian system a 
heightened sensitivity to the protection of employee rights. If arbitration 
were to be used in for individual employees, legislative protection that 
insures that they are not deprived existing legal protections would 
provide a more balanced system of dispute resolution. Given the current 
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power of business interests and the weakness of workers, however, this 
changes seems unlikely. 
